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In this paper we develop the concept of compromising accounts as a distinctive 
approach to the analysis of whether and how accounting can facilitate compromise 
amongst organizational actors. We take the existence of conflicting logics and values 
as the starting point for our analysis, and directly examine the ways in which the 
design and operation of accounts can be implicated in compromises between 
different modes of evaluation and when and how such compromises can be 
productive or unproductive. In doing so, we draw on Stark’s (2009: 27) concept of 
‘organizing dissonance’, where the coming together of multiple evaluative principles 
has the potential to produce a ‘productive friction’ that can help the organization to 
recombine ideas and perspectives in creative and constructive ways. In a field study 
of a non-government organization, we examine how debates and struggles over the 
design and operation of a performance measurement system affected the potential for 
productive debate and compromise between different modes of evaluation. Our study 
shows that there is much scope for future research to examine how accounts can 
create sites that bring together (or indeed push apart) organizational actors with 
different evaluative principles, and the ways in which this ‘coming together’ can be 













“There's still a big debate in VSO about whether the purpose is to make sure 
volunteers have a good experience overseas and then return back happy or do we 
have some sort of coherent development programmes which use volunteers as a key 
input.  I think there are those two different views of the organization.  I mean there's 
a whole lot of views between those two but those are the two extremes... it probably 
divides down the middle” (Regional Director 2, Voluntary Service Overseas).    
 
 The role of accounting practices in situations of different and potentially 
competing interests has been a prominent feature in studies of accounting and 
organizations. Some studies have shown how accounting practices can be mobilized 
by organizational actors to introduce a new order and model of organizational 
rationality, typically one focused on market concerns (e.g., Dent, 1991; Oakes, 
Townley & Cooper, 1998; Ezzamel, Willmott & Worthington, 2008). Other research 
has emphasized the role of accounting in situations of multiple and potentially 
conflicting interests, logics and regimes of accountability (e.g., Cooper, Hinings, 
Greenwood & Brown, 1996; Ahrens & Chapman, 2002; Lounsbury, 2008). In these 
settings, organizational subgroups can hold differing views of organizational reality 
that are not displaced, but can become layered (c.f., Cooper et al., 1996) such that 
they persist over time, or, as the quote above suggests, remain “divided down the 
middle.” Here, accounts such as costing, resource allocation, and performance 
measurement systems are involved in on-going contests and struggles as various 
groups advance particular interests and values (e.g., Nahapiet, 1988; Briers & Chua, 
2001; Andon, Baxter & Chua, 2007). Research on the use of financial and non-
financial measures in performance measurement systems (e.g., Kaplan & Norton, 
1992; Sundin, Granlund & Brown, 2010), or the use of quantitative and qualitative 
information in financial reports (e.g., Nicholls, 2009; Chahed, 2010), can also be seen 
to relate to the ways in which accounting practices can give voice to different 
concerns and priorities. Often the outcome of struggles between groups is intractable 
conflict and confused effort with the eventual dominance of a singular perspective 
that limits opportunities for on-going contests and debate (e.g., Dent, 1990; Fischer & 
Ferlie, 2013). Alternatively, the processes taken by sub-groups to promote their 
preferred views can sometimes achieve a more workable compromise that generates 
constructive debate and on-going dialogue (e.g., Nahapiet, 1988; Sundin et al., 2010).  
Building on this literature, in this study we analyse directly the ways in which the 
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design and operation of accounts can be implicated in compromises between different 
modes of evaluation and seek to illustrate when and how such compromises can be 
productive or unproductive.  
 As conflicting logics are probably unavoidable in any human organization 
(Gendron, 2002), our approach is to take the existence of, and the potential for, 
tension between different modes of evaluation as the starting point for our analysis. In 
doing so, we mobilize Stark’s (2009: 27) concept of ‘organizing dissonance’, which 
posits that the coming together of multiple evaluative principles has the potential to 
produce a ‘productive friction’ that can help the organization to recombine ideas and 
perspectives in creative and constructive ways. The concept of organizing dissonance 
provides an analytical approach that views the co-existence of multiple evaluative 
principles as an opportunity for productive debate, rather than a site of domination or 
intractable conflict. As such, our approach extends prior research by privileging 
analysis of when and how the co-existence of multiple evaluative principles can be 
productive or unproductive. We summarize the focus of our study in the following 
research questions: How does the design and operation of accounting practices 
facilitate (or impede) compromise in situations of multiple evaluative principles? 
When (and how) is compromise between different evaluative principles productive or 
unproductive? 
 We argue that answers to these questions contribute to the literature by focusing 
directly on how accounting is implicated in compromising between different 
evaluative principles and the way in which such compromise can be productive or 
unproductive. Here the design and operation of accounting practices can help 
organizational actors to re-order priorities and integrate perspectives in situations of 
co-existing and potentially competing values (Stark, 2009). In particular, we show 
how accounts have the potential to provide a fertile arena for productive debate 
between individuals and groups who have differing values (Stark; 2009; Jay, 2013; 
Gehman, Trevino & Garud, 2013; Moor & Lury, 2011; Denis, Langley & Rouleau, 
2007).  
 The findings from our field study of a non-government organization indicate 
that the potential for accounts to provide a fertile arena for productive debate is 
related to three important processes. First, designing accounts that productively 
manage tensions between different evaluative principles involves ‘imperfection’, that 
is, a process of ‘give and take’ that ensures that no single evaluative principle comes 
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to dominate others. Here the design and operation of accounting practices represents a 
temporary settlement between different evaluative principles that will require on-
going effort to maintain (c.f., Stark, 2009; Gehman et al., 2013). Second, the design 
and operation of accounts can facilitate productive friction by making visible the 
attributes of accounts that are important to organizational actors with different 
evaluative principles, a process that we term ‘concurrent visibility.’ This process is 
important because it serves to crystallize compromises between different modes of 
evaluation in a material form (Denis et al., 2007). Third, our study reveals an 
important distinction between the types of responses that can emerge in situations 
where compromises break down and accounting practices are viewed as ‘not 
working.’ In particular, we show how debates over the mechanics of accounting 
practices can be unproductive and lead to ‘stuckness’ (Jay, 2013) between different 
modes of evaluation, whereas debate focused on the principles underlying the account 
can help to integrate different evaluative principles in a productive way (Stark, 2009; 
Jay, 2013).  
 Overall, our approach improves understanding of how actors with different 
evaluative principles reach an acceptable compromise, the factors that promote and/or 
damage efforts to reach compromise, and the consequences for those individuals, 
groups, and organizations involved. Accounts are central to these processes because 
they are a site where multiple modes of evaluation potentially operate at once, with 
different modes of evaluation privileging particular metrics, measuring instruments 
and proofs of worth (Stark, 1996; 2009). Accounts of performance are critical because 
it is in discussions over the different metrics, images and words that can be used to 
represent performance that the actual worth of things is frequently debated and 
contested. An analysis of compromising accounts1 provides a powerful analytical lens 
for examining whether and how compromise between different modes of evaluation is 
developed, established and destroyed. In particular, we show how the design and 
operation of accounts can create the potential for ‘productive friction’ to arise from 
the coming together of different evaluative principles (Stark, 2009).  
 Our study also makes a more specific contribution to research on performance 
measurement systems. There has been a wealth of prior management accounting 
                                                 
1 We use the term ‘compromising accounts’ to refer to the role of accounts in facilitating (or not) 
compromise between actors with different evaluative principles. We develop this concept later in the 
paper.   
5 
 
studies focusing on the attributes of various performance metrics and their effects on 
individual and organizational performance (see, for example, research on subjectivity 
(Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede & Vargus, 2004; Moers, 2005), comprehensiveness 
(Hall, 2008) and financial/non-financial measures (e.g. Perera, Harrison & Poole, 
1997; Baines & Langfield-Smith, 2003). However, most of these studies do not 
explicitly investigate how the metrics that comprise performance measurement 
systems are developed (see Wouters & Wilderom (2008) and Townley, Cooper & 
Oakes (2003) for exceptions). Thus, we extend this literature by examining explicitly 
the processes that take place in negotiating the scope, design and operation of the 
metrics included in performance measurement systems.   
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we 
provide the theoretical framework for the study. The third section details the research 
method, with the fourth section presenting findings from our field study of a non-
government organization, Voluntary Service Overseas. In the final section we discuss 
our findings and provide concluding comments. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 Our focus is on whether and how accounting practices can aid compromises in 
situations of co-existing modes of evaluation. As such, in developing our theoretical 
framework, we draw on recent developments in the ‘sociology of worth’ to help 
conceptualize the co-existence of, and potential for agreement between, multiple 
evaluative systems (see for example, Stark, 2009; Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, 2006; 
McInerney, 2008; Denis et al., 2007; Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011). A focus of this 
perspective is to examine how competing values are taken into account when parties 
seek to reach agreement or resolve disputes. Boltanski & Thévenot (2006) 
conceptualize individuals as living in different ‘worlds’ or orders of worth, where 
each ‘world’ privileges particular modes of evaluation that entail discrete metrics, 
measuring instruments and proofs of worth (Stark, 2009).2 Instead of enforcing a 
                                                 
2 Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 2006) specify six ‘worlds’ or orders of worth (the ‘inspirational’, 
‘domestic’, ‘opinion’, ‘civic’, ‘merchant’ and ‘industrial’ worlds). The ‘civic’ world, for example, is 
based on solidarity, justice and the suppression of particular interests in pursuit of the common good, 
whereas the ‘market’ world is one with competing actors who play a commercial game to further their 
personal (rather than collective) goals. In this paper our key focus is on understanding why and how 
actors can reach compromises (or not) in situations that are characterised by the presence of multiple 
evaluative principles. In doing so, we follow the approach of Stark (2009, see p.13 in particular). That 
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single principle of evaluation as the only acceptable framework, it is recognized that it 
is legitimate for actors to articulate alternative conceptions of what is valuable, where 
multiple evaluative principles can potentially co-exist and compete in any given field 
(Stark, 2009; 1996; McInerney, 2008; Moor & Lury, 2011; Scott & Orlikowski, 2012; 
Kaplan & Murray, 2010).  
As co-existing evaluative principles may not be compatible, a ‘clash’ or 
dispute may emerge between parties, who at a given point in time, and in relation to a 
given situation, emphasize different modes of evaluation (Jagd, 2011; Kaplan & 
Murray, 2010). Following Stark (2009), who extends the framework of Boltanski and 
Thévenot (2006), our focus is directed not at the presence of particular logics or 
orders of worth, but on exploring the ways in which the co-existence of different 
logics can be productive or destructive. In doing so, we draw on Stark’s (2009) notion 
of organizing dissonance. Stark (2009) characterizes organizing dissonance as being a 
possible outcome of a clash between proponents of differing conceptions of value, 
that is, in situations when multiple performance criteria overlap. The dissonance that 
results from such a clash requires the organization to consider new ways of using 
resources in a manner that accommodates these different evaluative principles. Here, 
rather than something to be avoided, struggles between different evaluative criteria 
can prompt those involved to engage in deliberate consideration about the merits of 
existing practices (Gehman et al., 2013). In this way, keeping multiple performance 
criteria in play can produce a resourceful dissonance that can enable organisations to 
benefit from the ‘productive friction’ that can result (Stark, 2009). However, as Stark 
(2009: 27) notes, not all forms of friction will be productive, as there is a danger that 
“where multiple evaluative principles collide...arguments displace action and nothing 
is accomplished.”  This points to the critical nature of compromises when there are 
disputes involving different evaluative principles. In practice, such compromises can 
be facilitated by the use of conventions, as detailed in the following section.   
  
Disputes, conventions and accounting practices 
                                                                                                                                           
is, we do not confine our analysis to the six orders of worth as outlined by Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1999, 2006) but specify the different evaluative principles as is appropriate to the particular empirical 
setting. Given our approach, we do not elaborate further on the six orders of worth of Boltanski and 
Thévenot (1999, 2006) here. For further insight on the six orders of worth, see Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1999, 2006), and for their implications for accounting research, see Annisette and Richardson (2011) 
and Annisette and Trivedi (2013).  
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 The negotiation and development of conventions is seen as a critical tool to 
aid compromise in situations of co-existing evaluative principles (Denis et al., 2007). 
A convention is “an artefact or object that crystallises the compromise between 
various logics in a specific context” (Denis et al., 2007: 192). Conventions can help to 
bridge different perspectives by providing an acceptable compromise between 
competing value frameworks (Biggard & Beamish, 2003; Denis et al., 2007).  
 Accounting practices as a convention can help to resolve disputes in two inter-
related ways. One, the development and operation of accounts can provide a fertile 
arena for debate between individuals and groups with differing evaluative principles. 
The production of accounts is important to this process because different evaluative 
principles do not necessary conflict or compete continuously, but resurface at 
particular moments in time (Jay, 2013), such as during the design and operation of 
accounting practices. Two, the production of accounts can serve to ‘crystallize’ the 
compromise in a material form (c.f., Denis et al., 2007), thus providing recognition of, 
and visibility to, different values and principles. 
 Tensions over accounts and accounting practices are likely because they can 
have very real consequences for the ordering of priorities in an organization and, 
consequently, for the interests of groups within the organization who hold different 
views. It is well understood that accounting can make certain factors more visible and 
more important than others, provide inputs that affect decision-making and the 
allocation of resources, and can also provide authoritative signals regarding the very 
purpose and direction of the organization. In addition, research has highlighted the 
persuasiveness of numbers in accounts and the role of quantification in advancing 
particular views and interests (e.g., Robson, 1992; Porter, 1995; Vollmer, 2007).  
 Nahapiet’s (1988) study of changes to a resource allocation formula in the 
United Kingdom’s National Health Service showed how the formula made existing 
values more visible and tangible and thus acted as a stimulus which forced explicit 
consideration of three fundamental organizational dilemmas. In this setting, actors 
contested strongly the formula’s design and operation, and its interpretation by other 
groups. Different interpretations of the formula, and of accounting more generally, 
were problematic because they played a key role in establishing what counts and thus 
what is worthy. This tension is exacerbated in organizational settings where limited 
resources (e.g., money, time, space) mean that not all interests can be accommodated. 
In particular, the processes of evaluation inherent to the production of accounts are 
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central to problems of worth in organizations (c.f., Stark, 2009). For example, the 
process of developing, adjusting and reconfiguring accounts can require groups to 
make mutual concessions (i.e., compromise) in order to agree on the final (if only 
temporary) form and content of the account. In this way, producing accounts can 
provide an arena where different understandings of value may be articulated, tested, 
and partially resolved (Moor & Lury, 2011). However, while debate over accounts 
has the potential to facilitate productive friction, this depends on whether and how the 
convention comes to be (and continues to be) viewed as an ‘acceptable’ compromise. 
Importantly, although accounts as conventions may help enact compromises, they can 
also be subject to criticism and thus require on-going efforts to maintain and stabilize 
the compromise. 
 
Responses to breakdowns in compromise  
Designing accounting practices in the presence of co-existing modes of 
evaluation is likely to result in situations where the practice is viewed, at least by 
some actors in the organization, as ‘not working.’ Here there is a ‘breakdown’ such 
that issues and concerns that have arisen can no longer be absorbed into the usual way 
of operating (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). Some breakdowns can be viewed as 
temporary and so the focus is on what is problematic about the current practice and 
how to fix it (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). For example, doubts and criticisms can 
arise about the difficulties of implementing the practice, about whether it will result in 
the desired behaviours, and how it will influence other practices (Gehman et al., 
2013).  
This resonates with research in accounting that shows how the introduction of 
new accounting practices can result in criticisms that they have not been implemented 
correctly and revised procedures are required to improve the design and 
implementation process (e.g., Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 2004; Wouters & Roijmans, 
2011). A criticism of existing practices is also evident, for example, in the context of 
performance measurement systems that are seen to require more non-financial 
measures (Kaplan & Norton, 1992) and financial reports are viewed as needing more 
narrative information (Chahed, 2010). Such criticisms can result in changes to the 
existing accounting practices. Stark (2009) notes, however, that disputes over the 
mechanics of existing practices may not lead to effective changes, but rather result in 
a situation where nothing is accomplished. Here, co-existing modes of evaluation may 
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not lead to innovation, but rather oscillation and ‘stuckness’ between logics (Jay, 
2013). 
 A breakdown in practice can also be more severe such that existing ways of 
doing things no longer work and reflection at a distance from the existing practice is 
required (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). Here actors can debate the principles and 
values underlying the existing practice and the changes that are required to move 
beyond the breakdown (Gehman et al., 2013). This type of criticism and debate can 
arise where people feel that some fundamental principles with which they identify are 
not being respected (Denis et al., 2007). This can be particularly problematic in 
debates over incommensurables, that is, the process of denying “that the value of two 
things is comparable” (Espeland & Stevens, 1998: 326). Claims over 
incommensurables are important because they can be “vital expressions of core 
values, signalling to people how they should act toward those things” (Espeland & 
Stevens, 1998: 327). It can also arise where the values evident in the existing practice 
clash with deeply held values obtained through prior experience (Gehman et al., 
2013).  
 Debates over the underlying principles of accounting practices, and conventions 
more broadly, can result in what Stark (2009: 27) labels “organizing dissonance”, that 
is, a process of productive friction arising from debate between actors over different 
and potentially diverse evaluative principles. To generate productive friction in the 
context of such debates, the rivalry between different groups must be principled, with 
advocates offering reasoned justifications for their positions (Stark, 2009). In this 
situation actors become reflexively aware of latent paradoxes and directly confront 
and accept ambiguities, helping new practices that integrate logics to emerge (Jay, 
2013). The resolution of breakdowns also requires recognition that such a 
compromise represents a “temporary settlement” (Stark, 2009: 27) between 
competing value frameworks that is fragile (Kaplan & Murray, 2010) and only likely 
to be maintained via on-going effort and reworking (Gehman et al., 2013).  
 
Summary 
This discussion highlights the potential role for accounts in developing 
compromises in situations where the co-existence of different evaluative principles is 
a common feature of organizations. In particular, it reveals how accounts have the 
potential to act as a convention to help develop and crystallize compromises. It also 
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highlighted the way in which compromises are temporary settlements that require on-
going work to stabilize. In particular, the merits of an accounting practice may be 
called into question, resulting in efforts to ‘fix’ the way in which the practice 
currently operates and/or debate focused on resolving tensions between underlying 
principles and values. In the next section, we empirically examine the role of 
compromising accounts through a detailed analysis of the development of a 
performance measurement system that we observed during a longitudinal field study 
at Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO).  
 
Method 
 VSO is a non-governmental international development organization that works 
by (mainly) linking volunteers with partner organizations in developing countries. 
Each year approximately 1500 volunteers are recruited and take up placements in one 
of the over forty developing countries in which VSO operates. Our interest in VSO 
was sparked due to an initiative to develop a new performance measurement system, 
subsequently referred to as the ‘Quality Framework’ (QF). This framework attempted 
to combine different metrics and narrative content into a single report that would 
provide a common measure of performance in each of VSO’s country programmes.  
 The field study was conducted between July 2008 and August 2010. During this 
time we conducted 32 interviews, attended meetings, observed day-to-day work 
practices, collected internal and publicly available documents, participated in lunches 
and after-work drinks with staff and volunteers, primarily in London, but also during 
a one-week visit to the Sri Lanka programme office in January 2009.  
 Most of the interviews were conducted by one of the authors, with two authors 
conducting the interviews with the country directors. Interviews lasted from 30 
minutes to two hours. Almost all interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed, 
and, where this was not possible, extensive notes were taken during the interview and 
further notes then written-up on the same day. We interviewed staff across many 
levels of the organization as well as staff at different locations. Face-to-face 
interviews were conducted at VSO’s London headquarters, and in Sri Lanka. Due to 
the location of VSO staff around the world, some interviews (particularly those with 
country directors) were conducted via telephone. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
formal interviews and observations of meetings. We carried out observations of 17 
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meetings and workshops in both London and Sri Lanka, primarily concerned with the 
QF and other planning and evaluation practices.  
 Throughout the study, we were also involved in informal conversations 
(typically before and after meetings, and during coffee breaks, lunches and after-work 
drinks) where staff and volunteers expressed their thoughts about the meetings, as 
well as other goings-on at VSO and the non-government organization sector. We kept 
a detailed notebook of these informal conversations, which was then written up into 
an ‘expanded account’ (Spradley, 1980) that on completion of the field study totalled 
more than 200 pages of text. We also exchanged numerous emails (over 700 separate 
communications) and telephone conversations with VSO staff.  
 We were provided access to over 600 internal VSO documents, including 
performance measurement reports, supporting documents and analysis. These reports 
included the complete set of QF reports from each VSO programme office for 2008 
and 2009, documents related to other monitoring and review processes, as well as 
more general documents concerning organizational policies, plans and strategies. 
Finally, we collected publicly available documents, such as annual reports and 
programme reviews, newspaper articles, as well as several books on VSO (e.g. Bird, 
1998).  
 Consistent with the approach employed by Ahrens & Chapman (2004), Free 
(2008), and Chenhall, Hall & Smith (2010), we employed Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
methods.  This involved arranging the data (transcripts, field notes, documents) 
chronologically and identifying common themes and emerging patterns. We focused 
in particular on iterations in the content and use of performance measurement systems 
at VSO over time and then sought to understand why they came about and the 
subsequent reactions from different people within the organization. We then re-
organized this original data around key events (for example, the ‘league table’ 
debates) and significant issues (for example, ‘consistency’) that emerged as we sought 
to understand the performance measurement and review systems at VSO. We 
compared our emerging findings from the study with existing research to identify the 
extent of matching between our data and expectations based on prior theory. In 
particular, findings that did not appear to fit emerging patterns and/or existing 
research were highlighted for further investigation. This process was iterative 
throughout the research, and finished when we believed we had generated a plausible 




<insert Table 1 here> 
 
Case context  
VSO was founded in 1958 in England as an organization to send school 
leavers to teach English in the “underdeveloped countries” of the Commonwealth 
(Bird, 1998: 15). Volunteers were initially recruited exclusively from England, and 
later from other countries, including the Netherlands, Canada, Kenya, the Philippines, 
and India. The initial focus on the 18-year-old high school graduate was replaced over 
time by a (typically) 30-year old-plus experienced professional. Volunteers operated 
under a capacity building approach, being involved in initiatives such as teacher 
training, curriculum development, and advocacy.3  
 In 2004 VSO signalled it would adopt a more ‘programmatic’ approach to its 
work, which shifted attention away from each volunteer placement to one that focused 
“all our efforts on achieving specific development priorities within the framework of 
six development goals” (VSO, 2004).4 This move to a programmatic model was 
coupled with explicit recognition of VSO’s purpose as primarily a ‘development’ 
rather than ‘volunteer-sending’ organization, and the development of evaluation 
systems to support this change. Notwithstanding this explicit shift in organizational 
priorities, the focus on volunteering was still strong, particularly as many VSO staff 
were formerly volunteers. As such, a mix of different world-views at VSO was the 
norm: 
“There are some different kind of ideological views between people who feel that 
the important thing about VSO, it's just about international cooperation and getting 
people from different countries mixing with each other and sharing ideas. It doesn't 
matter what the outcome is really, it's going to be a positive thing but you don't need 
to pin it down. Versus it's all about pinning down the impact and the outcomes of 
our work and being very focused and targeted and being able to work out what is 
your return on your investment and all these kind of things so I think it is partly 
historical and partly differences in just a mindset or world-view.” (Interview, 
Regional Director 2, November 2008). 
 
                                                 
3 VSO operated what it calls a ‘capacity building’ approach by partnering volunteers with local 
organizations that require assistance or expertise in a variety of capacities. VSO describes its 
partnership approach as follows: “We work with local partners in the communities we work with, 
placing volunteers with them to help increase their impact and effectiveness” (VSO website, 
http://www.vsointernational.org/vso-today/how-we-do-it/, accessed 7 April 2010). Volunteers typically 
take up a specific role or position, often working alongside a local staff member, where partner 
organizations range in size from very small, local businesses, community groups and NGOs, to large 
organizations and government departments and ministries.  
4 The six development goals were health, education, secure livelihoods, HIV/AIDS, disability, and 
participation and governance (Focus for Change, VSO, 2004).  
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The different views on VSO’s overall purpose created considerable tension, 
focused in particular on debates about the value of VSO’s work. Originating from 
VSO’s founding principles, many staff and volunteers felt that volunteering was, in 
and of itself, a positive and productive activity and any drive to specify an ‘outcome’ 
of this was secondary. In contrast, the programmatic approach, coupled with the 
recruitment of many staff from other international development agencies, gave more 
attention to poverty reduction and demonstration of the ‘impact’ of VSO’s work. This 
situation was increasingly common in the wider NGO sector, where founding 
principles of volunteerism, the development of personal relationships, and respect for 
each individual were coming into contact with more ‘commercial’ values favouring 
professionalism, competition and standardization (see, for example, Parsons & 
Broadbridge, 2004; Helmig, Jegers & Lapsley, 2004; Hopgood, 2006).  
As an espoused international development organization, VSO also existed in 
an environment increasingly characterized by the use of indicators and targets (a 
prime example being the Millennium Development Goals, see United Nations, 2011) 
and a greater focus on the effectiveness of aid (particularly the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness in 2005).5 VSO’s main funder, the United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development (DFID), had aligned its development programme 
around the Millennium Development Goals, and was also a signatory to the Paris 
Declaration.6,7 This had implications for the way in which VSO was required to report 
to DFID, particularly during the course of our study when a change in DFID’s 
reporting format required VSO to track progress against its four agreed strategic 
objectives using a set of 17 indicators.8  
Collectively, the changing context of the NGO sector, the move in 
international development towards an increased focus on aid effectiveness and the use 
of indicators, along with VSO’s own progression from a volunteering to a more 
                                                 
5 See www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf for the Declaration. 
6 See DFID (2000), DFID (2006) and DFID (2009).  
7 In terms of the overall funding environment, VSO’s total funding increased steadily during the 2000s. 
In 2000 total income was approximately £28m, with approximately £22m from DFID (77% of total 
funds). In 2005 total income was approximately £34m, with approximately £25m from DFID (74% 
total funds). In 2009 total income was approximately £47m, with approximately £29m from DFID 
(60% total funds) (source: VSO Annual Reports).  
8 See www.vsointernational.org/Images/ppa-self-assessment-review-2010-11_tcm76-32739.pdf for the 
2010/2011 report to DFID (accessed 31 May 2012). The first report issued under this format was for 
the 2009/10 reporting year. Prior to this, there was an absence of indicators, with VSO reporting 
against various development outcomes using descriptive examples of progress from different countries 
(‘VSO Narrative Summary and Learning Report for PPA 2005-6’). 
14 
 
programmatic focus, meant that the co-existence of different evaluative principles 
characterized the situation at VSO. In particular, we identify two primary modes of 
evaluation.9 The first mode of evaluation, which we label ‘learning and uniqueness’, 
was focused primarily on reflection, the use of contextual and local interpretations, 
and a preference for narrative content. Discourses within VSO regularly emphasized 
the importance of this mode of evaluation, with one of VSO’s three stated values a 
“commitment to learning” whereby VSO seeks to “continue to develop effective 
monitoring and evaluation methods so that we can learn from our own and others’ 
works” (VSO, 2004). The second mode of evaluation, which we label ‘consistency 
and competition’, was focused primarily on standardization, the use of consistent and 
universal interpretations, and a preference for indicators. We outline the different 
modes of evaluation in Table 2, which we return to throughout our empirical analysis.  
 
<insert Table 2 here> 
 
 Attempts at compromise between these different modes of evaluation became 
evident in debates about how to measure the value of VSO’s work in each country. 
Measuring performance became particularly important because the move to be more 
programmatic had placed increased pressure on the allocation of resources amongst 
programme offices, as it required more expenditure on staff to support volunteer 
placements and develop and manage programmes.10 However, the situation was 
characterized by a lack of commonly agreed criteria for measuring the performance of 
country programmes (c.f., Garud, 2008), where over time three approaches had been 
instigated; the ‘Strategic Resource Allocation’ (SRA) tool, the ‘Annual Country 
Report’ (ACR) and the ‘Quality Framework’ (QF).11  
                                                 
9 As noted above, our approach here is to follow Stark (2009) and specify the different modes of 
evaluation in accordance with our empirical setting.  
10 VSO operated a geographic structure, whereby several programme offices were grouped together to 
form a specific region, for example, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan formed the 
‘South Asia’ region. Each Country Director reported to a ‘Regional Director’, with the Regional 
Directors reporting to the Director of IPG, based in London. IPG also had staff responsible for 
providing support to programme offices in areas such as funding, advocacy, and programme learning 
and reporting. Each programme office was a budget holder, and received core funding from VSO 
headquarters via the annual budgeting process. Core funding related to costs such as staff salaries and 
benefits, office and vehicle rental, and volunteer costs (including allowances and training/support 
costs). Each programme office received a limited amount of funding for ‘programme’ costs, with 
programme offices expected to apply for grants from donors to support further programme work.  
11 Our field study (July 2008 to August 2010) corresponded to the first year of the QF’s operation and 
thus was subsequent to the use of the SRA and ACR. As such, we briefly describe the SRA and ACR 
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 The SRA was developed in 2002 as VSO’s first attempt to measure the 
effectiveness of each programme office.12 The SRA relied almost exclusively on 
using numerical data to measure performance, where each programme office was 
required to score itself on 16 criteria related to the extent to which its work was 
focused on disadvantage, achieved certain outputs related to volunteers, and adopted a 
strategic approach. Each criterion was given a precise percentage weighting, e.g., 2% 
or 4% or 17%. Scores on the 16 criteria were to be aggregated with each programme 
office awarded a percentage score out of 100, with recognition that “the higher the 
overall percentage a Programme Office receives in this tool, the more “effective” it 
will be perceived to be based on this measure.”13 There was a strong emphasis on 
review of scores by staff in London “to ensure consistency between regions…in order 
to ensure transparency and to allow comparison between countries.”14 The SRA’s 
implementation was problematic, however, and the approach was abandoned as a 
country director later explained:  
“The SRA was dropped because it was becoming increasingly apparent that some 
programmes were rather self-critical while others were not - but that this did not 
necessarily relate very closely to programme quality - in fact it appeared that 
sometimes the opposite was true, the programmes that had the capacity to critically 
assess their own performance (and give themselves a low score) were of a better 
quality than those who from year to year claimed that things were going well - and 
this resulted in some good programmes being closed down.” (Interview, Country 
Director 1, November 2008).  
 
Subsequent to the SRA, the ACR was developed in 2005 and focused its 
reporting on the ‘activity’ that a country programme had engaged in, such as ‘so many 
workshops, so many volunteer placements.’15 The ACR itself did not contain any 
quantitative scoring or ranking of programme offices but was a narrative report that 
provided descriptions of progress towards ‘Strategic objectives’ and contained a 
section focused on ‘Lessons’ to be learned.16 The ACR also included one or more 
‘Most Significant Change’ (MSC) stories’ which focused on telling stories as a way to 
reflect upon and learn from programme experiences (see Dart & Davies, 2003; Davies 
& Dart, 2005).  
                                                                                                                                           
to provide context to the development of the QF but do not analyze the development of the SRA and 
ACR in detail. 
12 See Appendix 1 which provides the ‘summary page’ of the SRA. 
13 SRA document, 2002. 
14 SRA document, 2002. 
15 Interview, Country Director 2, November 2008. 
16 ACR document, 2005.  
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The third approach (and our empirical focus) developed subsequent to the 
SRA and ACR was the QF, which attempted to combine scoring and narrative 
elements into a single reporting framework. We show how the QF was subject to 
criticism that resulted in changes in the use of narrative and quantitative measures, 
which favoured a mode of evaluation focused on ‘consistency’ over that which 
respected the ‘unique’ circumstances of individual country programmes. A further 
dispute emerged over the relative focus on ‘learning’ and ‘competition’ that 
precipitated more fundamental changes in order to develop an account that helped to 
compromise between the different modes of evaluation. 
 
Development of the quality framework 
  The initial development of the QF occurred during a meeting of all country 
directors in late 2007.17 Prior to this meeting, in an email sent to all country directors 
in May 2007, the Director of IPG gave his support to the development of the QF and 
outlined his rationale for its implementation: 
“We are very good at measuring volunteer numbers, numbers of tools being used, 
early return rates, levels of programme funding – but what about the impact of our 
work?  How do we know if we really are working with poor people to contribute to 
positive change in their lives?...I believe that it is absolutely essential that we have a 
shared vision of success - that we all know what a high quality, successful VSO 
country programme could look like - that we know how to measure this - and that 
we have a culture that encourages, supports and celebrates this.  Of course all of our 
country programmes could, and should, look very different.  Local circumstances 
and development priorities above all should ensure this…However, there must be 
some fundamental principles that drive VSO's programme work and enable us to 
determine whether we are successful or not.” 
 
 In this statement, the imperative for compromise between VSO’s different 
modes of evaluation in the development of the QF was revealed. The reference to a 
‘shared vision of success’ and knowing ‘how to measure this’ indicates a concern 
with developing common and standardized ways of measuring success. There is also 
recognition of the uniqueness of country programmes in that they ‘should look very 
different.’ In our analysis below, we focus on two central debates that emerged in the 
development of the QF; the first concerning the tension between standardization and 
                                                 
17 As noted above, the first report to DFID that used indicators to track progress against strategic 
objectives was for the 2009/10 reporting year. Within VSO, work to address the new reporting 
requirements began in the second half of 2008, more than one year after the initial development of the 
QF. We also note that the QF reports were not provided to DFID or to any other external funders, 
although the IPG Director commented that he did inform DFID about the QF process and that this was 
considered by him to be ‘helpful’ in showing DFID that VSO was addressing issues around the impact 
of its work.   
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uniqueness, and the second regarding the most appropriate approach to improve 
programme quality. 
 
Debate 1: How to standardize and respect uniqueness? 
 A key difficulty in developing the QF was tension between the desire to 
standardize, i.e., have indicators that provide a consistent method for measuring 
success in each programme office, whilst respecting the uniqueness of programme 
offices and the need for indicators to be ‘inspirational.’ It was the need to make 
choices about the content of elements, indicators and narrative components in the QF 
that provided an arena for debates and discussions regarding different modes of 
evaluation at VSO. Country directors and other programme staff were central to these 
discussions, and provided suggestions for elements and indicators that were collected 
in London, and then followed in late 2007 by a meeting of all country directors and 
senior IPG staff in Cambridge, UK. A central platform of this meeting was sessions 
devoted to dialogue and debate about the elements and indicators that would comprise 
the QF. Centred on the question “What is quality?”, it was here that staff were able to 
advocate for the inclusion and exclusion of particular elements and indicators. This 
resulted in a set of 14 elements relating to various aspects of programme quality, such 
as inclusion, volunteer engagement, innovative programming and financial 
management. Importantly, the elements relating to the impact of VSO’s work on 
partners and beneficiaries were given highest priority: they were the first two 
elements in the QF and were assigned the labels ‘Element A’ and ‘Element B’ to 
distinguish them from the other elements that were labelled with numbers one through 
twelve (see Appendix 2).  
 Testing the QF at the country level was a priority, with a country director 
offering the following reflections on a pilot test:  
“We worked through the different indicators to see whether the results that the 
framework spat out were recognizable…some of the results didn't give the right 
answer basically. So we changed some of the indicators...The framework itself 
allows for a small narrative at the beginning of each element, which can at least 
explain context as to why it may have a low score or conversely why it might have a 
high score.  They may be working in a country that has a very easy operational 
environment.  It might have lots of external funding and that for me is reflected in 
that short narrative section at the beginning.” (Interview, Country Director 1, 
November 2008). 
 
 This comment reveals how local knowledge was considered critical in that 
indicators were required to produce results that were ‘recognizable’ to programme 
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office staff, partners and volunteers. Providing space in the QF report for narrative 
discussion to reflect the different circumstances of countries was also important. In 
particular, the narratives in the QF reports were typically very extensive and 
contained statements calling attention to the unique situation of each country. They 
also sought to celebrate achievements as a way to inspire staff, volunteers and other 
stakeholders, for example, by stating that “the success of the education programme in 
demonstrating beneficiary level impact in [Country X] is extraordinary and it is 
motivating for staff and volunteers to be able to see the impact of their work.”18 
Further recognition of country uniqueness was evident in the design of the 
performance ranges for the indicators: 
“Many of the KPIs have got ranges set against them to outline what ‘high 
performance’, ‘satisfactory performance’ and ‘room for improvement’ looks like. 
However, in some cases it will be more relevant for CDs and Regional Directors to 
decide what results say about the performance of the programme within the context 
of the programme itself…it is recognised that what can be considered high 
performance will differ considerably between Programme Offices.”19  
 
 In this quote, there is explicit recognition of differences between countries that 
prevents the use of standardized performance ranges for each and every indicator. As 
such, eight of the indicators in the QF were scored with guidance that “performance 
[to be] determined by PO [programme office] and RD [regional director]”. Finally, in 
contrast to the SRA, elements were not given explicit weights and there was no 
calculation of an overall score for each programme office.   
 There was also scope for constructive debate lasting beyond the QF’s initial 
development. Country and regional directors were required to discuss the scoring for 
an individual programme office together, and to analyze and resolve differences in 
scores that emerged from this process. Furthermore, many staff from programme 
offices completed the QF together, providing a way to review overall results, and 
many regional directors used the QF to help set objectives and action plans for 
country directors in the coming year. Some programme offices embraced the QF even 
further, using it to determine whether an office move would improve programme 
quality, or further disaggregating the QF so it could be applied to different parts of the 
programme office. 
                                                 
18 QF Country Report, 2008. 
19 QF Guidance document, 2008. 
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 Collectively, the input of country directors and other programme staff, the 
importance of local knowledge in designing indicators, providing space for narrative 
so that programme offices could reflect local circumstances, and recognition that 
performance on some indicators was best determined using programme office and 
regional director judgement, provided explicit recognition of the uniqueness of 
programme offices. Critically, however, the need for comparability was also 
recognized. Each programme office was required to complete the QF using a common 
template, with common elements and indicators, thus providing a standardized 
method of measuring performance across countries.  
 After its first year of operation, praise for the QF was widespread, with this 
comment from a country director echoing that of many others: 
 “Overall it was a good move away from the Annual Country Report because one of 
the main things was it gave much more direction on being clear on what to report on 
but also through the report it identified what is important, what’s quality but it's also 
important to reflect on as a programme.  Now you can always argue about elements 
of that, that's not the point.  I think it's just helpful to say well these are overall 
important parts to reflect on and I thought that was quite useful.” (Interview, 
Country Director 2, November 2008). 
 
 In this statement, the QF is seen as better than the ACR because it provides 
clarity around what makes a quality country programme, and, in this way, provided a 
‘collectively recognized’ reference regarding the way in which programme offices 
would be evaluated (c.f., Jagd, 2007; Biggart & Beamish, 2003). Importantly, this 
quote also reveals that although there is recognition that the QF was and would be the 
site of disagreements (e.g., over elements), it was the overall approach of focusing on 
what made a quality programme that was most important. This corresponded to the 
view of the IPG Director, who also praised the QF: 
“I think it's been great.  It's not a perfect tool but I don't think any tool in 
development ever is perfect… there wasn't a lot of discussion about quality or about 
success and the discussions were more about how many volunteers have we got or 
how much programme funding have we got and the quality framework has been a 
really useful tool over the last 18 months for just getting people to talk more about 
impacts on poverty. Quality, what is quality like?…[The QF has] given me stronger 
evidence when arguing at senior management team level for where things aren't 
working. So when you've got 35 country directors saying things like the finance 
systems aren’t working it gives you a lot of evidence to be able to really argue for 
that…so from [that] basis, I think it's gone really well." (Interview, IPG Director, 
December 2008). 
 
 Here, praise is directed at how the QF helped move discussions more towards 
the impact of programmes on partners and beneficiaries and less on volunteer 
numbers or funding levels. The ability to aggregate data across programme offices 
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was important in providing arguments for more resources at senior management 
forums.20 The statements that the QF was not ‘a perfect tool’ but was ‘quite useful’ 
and ‘worked out pretty well’ reveal an awareness of the importance of ‘making do’ 
(c.f., Andon et al., 2007), which helped to enact a certain stability between a mode of 
evaluation that privileged country uniqueness and one favouring standardization and 
comparability. However, such stability was temporary, highlighting the fragility of the 
compromise. While there was initial praise for the QF from many sources, there were 
also critics. Shortly after the completion of the QF in its first year, it was subject to 
strong criticism, aimed in particular at the process used to score the indicators and 
elements.  
 
But you’re not consistent! 
 The scoring process for the QF was based on self-assessment by the country 
director (with programme office staff input), with review by the relevant regional 
director. This raised concerns, particularly from some staff in London, that scoring 
was inconsistent across regions and countries:  
“(The) key anomaly is that the ratings seem to have been applied differently in each 
region…I believe this is an inaccurate reflection of the current strengths and 
weaknesses of programme funding across IPG…I suspect there are different 
interpretations as to what constitutes good programme funding performance…I 
think there is a need to clarify what justifies a 1, 2, 3 or 4 within each indicator.”21  
 
This comment reveals that the scoring methodology was criticized for 
producing inaccurate results, with the problem being a dislike of the different 
interpretations of good performance made by different countries. The suggested 
solution was to instigate changes to the scoring procedure to clarify the meaning of 
each score.  
A senior IPG manager was the most vocal critic of the scoring process, which 
he believed was “extremely dubious.” He lamented the SRA’s demise and concluded 
that shifting the balance in favour of self-assessment in the QF had created what he 
believed were questionable results. He expressed a preference for taking the scoring 
of indicators and elements out of the hands of country and regional directors 
                                                 
20 The Director of IPG was a member of the six-person executive management team at VSO called the 
‘Senior Management Team’ (other members were the Chief Executive Officer, Director of the VSO 
Federation, Director of the UK Federation, the Chief Financial Officer, and the Director of Human 
Resources). This group was responsible for major resource allocation decisions, particularly the 
amount of funds that were allocated to each of the major divisions within VSO, including IPG. 
21 QF Element Summary document, 2008. 
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altogether.  He first floated the idea of using an external assessment process akin to an 
“OFSTED-type inspection unit.”22 Another option was the use of an internal 
assessment unit within VSO to carry out an “independent performance assessment.” 
These preferences strongly emphasized the importance of having a ‘consistent 
methodology’ with ‘independence’, which, in effect, placed the values of 
standardization and comparability above those of local context and country 
uniqueness.  
 Although the use of an internal or external performance assessment unit did not 
materialize, the criticism resulted in several changes to the QF for its second year of 
operation. Each indicator now included a description of each of the 1-4 levels, where 
previously only levels 1 and 4 had a description. Revised guidance documentation 
was also issued: 
“It is important to score yourself precisely against the descriptors. There may be 
very good reasons why you achieve a low score on a particular indicator, but it is 
important to score precisely – the narrative can be used to give a brief 
explanation.”23 
 
This guidance highlights two important changes. First, there was the explicit emphasis 
on the need to score precisely, with the reasons that lay behind particular scores 
considered secondary. Second, the narrative was now viewed as the space where 
scores can be explained, indicating that its primary value was its connection to the 
scoring process, not in providing information that can arise from other sources. In 
further changes, the guidance “what can be considered high performance will differ 
considerably between Programme Offices” was removed from the QF documentation, 
the scoring of only one (rather than the previous eight) of the indicators was to be 
assessed using judgement,24 and ownership of some scoring was taken away from 
programme offices, with the explanation that this would allow “data to be comparable 
across programmes by using universal interpretations of the data.”25  
 Concerns over the scoring process itself were also addressed, particularly in 
relation to ensuring consistency in the way that regional directors used indicator 
                                                 
22 OFSTED is the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills in the UK, an 
independent body that inspects schools and provides ratings of performance. For example, schools are 
awarded an overall grade from 1 to 4, where 1 is outstanding, 2 is good, 3 is satisfactory and 4 is 
inadequate (OFSTED website, www.ofsted.gov.uk/, accessed 24 July 2010).  
23 QF Guidance document, 2009. 
24 As an example, indicator 8.1 on funding was changed whereby the ability to assess performance on 
a ‘country by country’ basis was replaced with explicit monetary ranges that would apply to each 
programme office regardless of its size of operations or different external funding environments. 
25 QF Reporting Template, 2009. 
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scores to determine overall element scores. A series of meetings was arranged to 
address this issue directly. One of these meetings, which lasted for over two hours, 
involved regional directors working through a recently completed QF report in order 
to agree on how to score each element. One by one, through each of the 14 elements, 
the process for using indicator scores to determine an overall element score was 
discussed. Looking fed-up, a regional director said:  
“Can I just ask, do we really care how accurately we score? [quizzical looks from 
other regional directors]. No, honestly, so we could spend a lot of time working out 
how we score it and use it for comparison but I mean you could roughly get a score 
on an average without spending too much time on the scoring but concentrate on 
what they’re saying, and concentrate on quality discussion which presumably we 
also want to do.” (Regional Director 5, QF meeting, May 2009).  
 
 The ensuing discussion did not focus on what programme offices were ‘saying’, 
or on how to ‘concentrate on quality discussion.’ Rather, debate focused on whether 
the ‘average’ was a legitimate way to determine element scores, and whether the most 
important indicator in each element should be designated as the ‘lead’ indicator for 
the purposes of scoring. This reveals how debate and disagreement was focused 
exclusively on the mechanics of the scoring process, rather than providing a forum for 
the consideration of the different substantive issues in play. Despite a protracted 
discussion, at the meeting’s end there was no established process, except for general 
agreement that an overall element score “won’t be based on an arithmetic average of 
KPI results for that element.”26 Notwithstanding this guidance, virtually all changes to 
the QF resulting from this criticism privileged consistency in scoring over that of 
country uniqueness. While more consistent scores were (arguably) likely, the initial 
compromise appeared tenuous and a counter-criticism developed around the lack of 
inspiration evident in the QF.  
 
But you’re not inspiring! 
 The focus on consistency and precision in the changes to the scoring process 
meant that the use of indicators to inspire was given minimal attention. Concerns 
were expressed in a QF meeting in March 2009: 
Regional Director 3: The messages that we’re giving to programs at the moment 
about thinking creatively, being ambitious, being innovative and so on, are not 
necessarily captured in this element, in this thing here [points at the QF 
document]…I think this is really good for telling us where we’re at and measuring 
                                                 
26 QF Guidance document, 2009. 
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what we’re looking at measuring but in terms of really looking to shift and change, I 
just wonder how we’re going to do that, and where that’s captured. 
PLA27 Staff 1: I think there’s a bit that’s still missing in the quality framework 
because it’s become a set of indicators, so the bit that I think is missing is that we 
don’t really have anything about culture. 
Regional Director 3: Yeah, that’s what it is, yeah [enthusiastically]. 
PLA Staff 1: If people fulfil all these indicators…that might not be enough to 
achieve what we’re really looking for, you know…we’ve got fixed on the elements 
but there’s something behind it all that we haven’t quite nailed… 
 
Here, a strong criticism of the QF is made by likening it to a ‘set of indicators’, 
with such a description generally considered to be a damning indictment of any 
evaluation practice at VSO. Furthermore, concern is expressed that indicators cannot 
capture what is most valued, that is, the desire to ‘shift and change’, ‘achieve what 
we’re really looking for’ and ‘culture’ are ‘missing’ in the QF. This concern was 
coupled with critical feedback on other changes made to the QF, for example, the 
emphasis on standardization meant that the indicators no longer captured performance 
‘accurately.’ Reflecting general concern with the changes, this statement appeared in 
one country programme’s QF report: 
“The QF report has grown exponentially this year, and the indicators have changed 
and were only issued a month before the report is due…Good practice in monitoring 
and evaluation is to collect evidence and learning on a day-to-day basis, which is 
difficult to do if the ground keeps shifting under one’s feet.”28 
 
 Increasingly, discussions of the QF were focused on criticisms and counter-
criticisms over the specific details of the scoring process. A regional director 
summarized the state-of-play after completion of the QF for the second year: 
“People can see that we’ve tried to make it a little bit more objective in the way that 
it’s done, but I am getting quite a lot of critical feedback that the quality framework 
is so big, so many indicators, stuff being sent really late…the whole thing is just a 
quantitative scoring tool and it’s not about learning in any way, shape or form…so I 
am getting quite critical feedback” (Regional Director 5, QF meeting, May 2009). 
 
 In this quote, the focus on indicators and scoring processes is viewed as stifling 
opportunities for learning. Thus, an initial compromise between standardization 
through scoring and recognition of country uniqueness had faltered. The initial praise 
for the QF had dissipated and was replaced by critical feedback, particularly from 
country directors who felt that the push for consistency had moved too far such that 
the QF was no longer about learning and instead was labelled as a ‘quantitative 
                                                 
27 The PLA (Programme Learning and Advocacy) unit was a team within VSO whose main role was to 
support programme offices in learning from their own work and sharing good practice with other 
programme offices.  
28 QF Country Report, 2009. 
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scoring tool’, a severe condemnation at VSO. We also see that the debates about 
indicators, performance ranges, or scoring methodologies were increasingly focused 
on the QF itself, often in the context of long meetings with little productive output. 
The previously fruitful discussions about how to improve quality or make 
compromises between differing values were almost non-existent. These developments 
were also evident in initial debates about how to use the QF to improve programme 
office performance.  
 
Debate 2: How to improve quality? 
 Given the considerable effort that had gone into the development of the QF, 
there were high hopes that it would lead to improved performance of programme 
offices. On the one hand, there was a strong desire to improve through ‘learning’, 
whereby the QF would help identify examples of innovative practice that could then 
be shared amongst programme offices. Concurrently, there was a belief that the QF 
could be used to generate a sense of ‘competition’ amongst programme offices, which 
would lead to increased motivation and thus improved performance. These different 
positions on the avenues to improved performance presented many obstacles to 
enacting an acceptable compromise; obstacles that, at first, proved difficult to 
overcome. 
 Although not stated explicitly in QF documentation, the engendering of a sense 
of competition emerged through the way in which the results were distributed to 
country directors via email: 
Country Director 9: “We were sent back a kind of world-wide kind of scoring sheet 
and obviously all that that had was a series of numbers.  Sort of 1, 2, 3 filled with 
red and green and orange. Although to be honest we came second in the world…I 
feel quite sorry for the countries that have scored quite low because I really don't 
think it's a valid scoring system…but for me it was quite handy to be able to say this 
and say “maybe next year- first” and all the rest.” 
“How do you know you are second in the world?  Was there some kind of ranking?” 
Country Director 9: “Yeah, they sent us a ranking.  They sent us a worldwide 
ranking thing afterwards.”   
“And so countries were rank ordered from 1 to 34?” 
Country Director 9: “Yeah it was a summary of results with ranking.  And you could 
look against different scores so you could see that…globally you came second on 
something and third on something else but then there was an overall sort of score.” 
(Interview, Country Director 9, November 2008) 
 
 Despite reference to an ‘overall sort of score’, the spreadsheet did not contain a 
summary score for each country and countries were not ranked, but listed in 
alphabetical order. As such, Country Director 9’s country only appeared ‘second in 
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the world’ by virtue of its name beginning with a letter near the beginning of the 
alphabet. Other similar stories emerged of countries with names that started with 
letters towards the end of the alphabet believing that they had performed poorly. 
These examples were the source of much joking at IPG staff meetings in London, 
with suggestions that ‘Albania’ will be top of the league table next year, and that the 
solution was to put countries in reverse alphabetical order. This light-heartedness 
about rankings belied an appreciation of how aware country directors were of the 
competitive mantra that lay behind the spreadsheet’s distribution, and how this was 
viewed as stifling learning opportunities, as one country director commented:  
“When this whole [QF] thing was being started, some of the conversations were 
framed around what are the indicators of quality in a programme office that is doing 
well.  How do we assess whether Ghana is better than Zimbabwe or vice versa? So I 
think the framing of the conversations around that time kind of planted the seeds of 
a league table…as long as people continue to see it [the QF] as a league table then 
we might see each other as competitors and therefore everybody [will keep] what he 
or she is doing very close to their chest” (Interview, Country Director 6, November 
2008).  
 
 Importantly, several features of the spreadsheet served to reinforce the ‘league 
table mentality’ noted by the country director. First, it ‘was a series of numbers’ and 
did not contain any of the narrative discussion. Second, only the overall element 
scores were displayed without the specific indicator scores. Third, each element score 
of 1 to 4 was assigned a colour to make differences between scores in the spreadsheet 
visually distinct, with ‘Low’ performers particularly prominent as scores of ‘1’ were 
assigned the colour red. This led regional directors to question the use of scores to 
promote learning, suggesting that it was their role, rather than that of a spreadsheet, to 
direct country directors to examples of good practice. More fundamentally, however, 
not only was comparison of countries in a spreadsheet not considered helpful for 
sharing best practice, but the uniqueness of each country also made such comparisons 
‘unfair’: 
Regional Director 1: “I don’t see the value of knowing that, for example, on maybe 
even six of the twelve criteria, West Africa comes out worse than say South-East 
Asia because my interpretation instinctively would be what are the cultural, 
educational, historical background, you know, accumulation of circumstances in 
South-East Asia that means that they’re in a completely different environment.”  




PLA Staff 1: “Yeah, but it’s an unfair competition…It’s like getting Marks & 
Spencers compared with Pete’s Café across the road where you’ve got totally 
different contexts.”29 
(QF meeting, March 2009) 
 
 Claims of unfairness speak to tensions arising because the principle that country 
uniqueness is important was not being respected. The process of reducing 
performance on an element to a standardized metric was seen by country directors to 
have ensured that the contextual information required to understand these scores had 
been stripped away. Even when this information was present in the narrative section, 
it did not accompany the scores in the spreadsheet and was thus seemingly ignored (or 
considered too difficult to take into account). In this way, the ideals embodied in 
different modes of evaluation did not co-exist as the values of competition had in 
effect ‘swamped’ the values of learning and country uniqueness.  
 This situation was also problematic because improving quality through learning 
was an explicit ambition of the QF, with one of its stated purposes “to help identify 
strengths and areas for improvement across programmes so that steps can be taken to 
grow programme quality and foster learning” (emphasis in original).30 Country 
directors, however, felt that there was no formal mechanism for sharing learning 
between programme offices. Consequently, the view amongst country directors was 
that learning from the QF had been given a relatively low priority, and its potential for 
sharing good practice went unfulfilled. Seeking to reorder these priorities was an 
important debate in preparing the QF for its second year. 
 
Reordering priorities of learning and competition 
 Over a series of three meetings, IPG staff debated ranking programme offices 
using QF data. This excerpt is from the first meeting in March 2009: 
Regional Director 3: “You don’t have to send it [the scores] out in a table to 
everybody but you can go and look and say ‘right, ok, this country over here does 
really good volunteer engagement, why don’t we arrange some sort of visit or some 
sort of support from that’, that would absolutely make sense but to send something 
out and say look for the [countries that have scored] fours and talk to them doesn’t.” 
Regional Director 2: […] “I think we all agree there’s a reason to link people up 
according to where there is good practice, or good performance and there are ways 
to do that that aren’t about a published table. So, who’s for a published table, who’s 
against a published table, who’s for a published table at this stage?”  
                                                 
29 Marks and Spencers is a large UK department store whose annual revenue in the financial year 
2009/10 was £9.5 billion. Pete’s Café was a small café immediately opposite the VSO building in 
London.  




Regional Director 4: “Obviously we [regional directors] are discouraging”.  
Director, IPG: “I would reflect on it a bit further…I’m not sure how helpful it is 
when the table only had the element scoring and it’s very subjective…so I think 
work out if anyone else found it useful…I’m thinking all of this is worth picking up 
again in that next meeting.” 
 
 Here, regional directors were generally against the idea of a spreadsheet being 
the vehicle for identifying good practice, instead arguing that they should take an 
active role in linking up programme offices to help improve performance. In 
particular, there was a strong argument against using scores of four (the highest score 
possible on an element) to identify what is considered good practice. The IPG 
Director believed that using the QF to create competition was sound, but could see 
weaknesses in the mechanics of the league table (‘only…element scoring’, ‘very 
subjective’).  As such, he was not yet convinced of the league table’s apparent 
inappropriateness and stalled any decision to the next meeting.  
 Convened in May 2009, the next QF meeting was focused on convincing the 
IPG Director (not in attendance) that a ranking was not appropriate: 
Regional Director 3: “I’m just wondering what the reason for having a league table 
is.” 
PLA Staff 1: “I think it’s the idea you publish information and then people will be 
shamed, people will feel they got a low performance, they will feel forced to have to 
make improvement because it’s public.” 
PLA Staff 3: “There is a real danger of labelling them [programme offices], isn’t 
there?  That’s what’s really horrible about this because someone then gets labelled 
as being the office that’s rubbish at volunteer engagement or the one that’s great at 
such and such.”  
PLA Staff 1: “Yeah, yeah I agree, yeah. The reason I really don’t like it, I don’t see 
how an organization’s [that’s] about volunteering and is very personal how 
that…sort of…philosophy could really fit with this [league table], but the other 
thing is I think it will change the quality framework from being a learning tool… my 
real fear is if you publish the scores people get fixated on doing well on particular 
indicators, which we’re now saying aren’t good enough, rather than the spirit of 
trying to actually improve…so I think it’s a combination of philosophy in terms of 
what VSO is about but also, you know, keeping the quality framework as something 
that is a learning tool.” 
 
 In contrast to the arguments used in the first meeting, this criticism was more 
fundamental, in that it directly criticized the very principles upon which the 
spreadsheet and (apparent) ranking system was based. Here, the use of competition to 
‘label’ and ‘shame’ programme offices into improvements was viewed as ‘horrible’ 
and the league table considered incompatible with the purpose of the QF as a learning 
tool. Finally, and perhaps most telling, is that ranking programme offices was viewed 
as being against the ideals of ‘volunteering’ and personal engagement that are 
considered critical to VSO’s philosophy, as expressed above by PLA Staff 1.  In June 
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2009, a third and final meeting to debate the league table issue was convened. The 
above arguments were used in this QF meeting with the IPG Director, and a 
compromise agreed:  
Director, IPG: “All right, let’s do it a different way…let’s ask each element leader to 
highlight confidentially where they think there are real concerns.” 
PLA Staff 2: “So, ok, that’s fine, then what? What happens to that information?” 
Director, IPG: “So basically the element leaders are informing discussions about 
where we might prioritize…so the top three is highlighting good practice, giving an 
indication to countries across the world where they might want to talk to in terms of 
good practice, and the bottom one is just confidential for management purposes.”  
 
Importantly, the earlier appeals by the IPG Director to improve the mechanics 
of the league table were no match for arguments undermining the very principle upon 
which it was based. As such, the compromise between competition and learning, 
between comparisons and sharing good practice, was resolved by abolishing the 
league table and replacing it with a new practice of differential disclosure. That is, the 
identity of good performers would be made public whereas the identity of poor 
performers would be kept confidential. Disclosure of good performers would allow 
the sharing of good practice between programme offices, and disclosure of poor 
performers to the IPG Director would allow management action to be taken but 
without ‘naming and shaming’ programme offices in the process. It is here that 
debates about the league table facilitated productive discussion between those who 
viewed ‘competition’ as the route to improvement versus those who saw learning as 
the way to increase quality. Unlike the debates over consistency in scoring, discussion 
was not focused on the QF per se, but was connected to broader principles, such as 
uniqueness and innovation, competition and a volunteering ethos. In this way, 
principled argument led to a compromise between different evaluative principles, 
despite strong enthusiasm for the spreadsheet and ranking system to remain.  
 
Epilogue 
 Towards the end of the field study, a review of existing “Quality Initiatives at 
VSO” was conducted, including the QF. While analysis of the QF was generally 
favourable, numerous “areas of improvement” were suggested: 
Its holistic and coherent nature allows people to think more broadly and reflect on 
the progress of the whole programme…The process of doing the report makes 
people take stock, consider areas of improvement and make action plans 
accordingly….It seems that the QF is not referred to or used as often as people 
would like…The numbers are not useful because they are too mechanistic, yet 
subjective and inconsistent across POs… [Self-assessment] is a great way for the PO 
to take stock and think about their performance and how to make improvements. But 
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many people feel that this needs some kind of external support and verification… 
although the design of the framework is quick and simple…It has become too long 
and its design means that indicators are ‘set in stone’ to a certain degree in order to 
make comparisons from one year to the next.31  
 
 This analysis reveals that the QF enabled broad thinking but was not used 
enough; self-assessment helped to ‘take stock’ but needed external verification; and 
the QF was simple, yet too long. We see that positive features of the QF that were 
closely aligned to one mode of evaluation inevitably gave rise to suggestions for 
improvement that sought to address the concerns of those with different evaluative 
principles. The evaluation highlights how the compromises being made in the design 
and operation of the QF were not ‘resolved’ but formed a series of temporary 
settlements (c.f., Stark, 2009; Kaplan & Murray, 2010; Gehman et al., 2013) between 
different evaluative principles. In this way, the process of establishing and 
maintaining compromises between different modes of evaluation can be seen as a 
dynamic and enduring feature of a compromising account.  
 
Discussion 
 Taking tensions between different logics and values as the starting point for our 
analysis, this study has focused directly on how accounting is implicated in 
compromising between different evaluative principles and the way in which such 
compromise can be productive or unproductive. Accounts are particularly important 
in settings of conflicting values because they are sites where multiple modes of 
evaluation all potentially operate at once (Stark, 2009). Our field study shows how 
VSO’s attempts to measure the performance of its programme offices brought 
together differing modes of evaluation, one based primarily on ‘Learning and 
Uniqueness’ and the other based primarily on ‘Consistency and Competition’, where 
each mode of evaluation was distinguished according to its purpose, the desirable 
attributes of a good evaluation and subsequently the desirable attributes of a good 
account (see Table 2). Making choices about indicators, types of scoring processes, 
the identification of good and poor performers, and different methods of data analysis, 
created sites for debate between individuals and groups who espoused these different 
evaluative principles (Stark; 2009; Jay, 2013; Gehman et al., 2013; Moor & Lury, 
2011; Denis et al., 2007). In this way, our analysis reveals how an account itself can 
                                                 
31 Review of Quality Initiatives at VSO document, 2010. 
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act as an agent in the process of compromise between different evaluative principles. 
A compromising account is thus both the process of, and at particular moments the 
specific outcome of, a temporary settlement between different modes of evaluation. 
Analogous to Chua’s (2007) discussion of strategizing and accounting, this draws 
attention to a compromising account as both a noun, i.e., the account itself that is 
produced in some material form (e.g., a balanced scorecard, a financial report), and as 
a verb, i.e., the processes of compromise that lead to and follow on from the physical 
production of an account.  
 Our study shows that differences in the design and operation of accounting 
practices can affect the extent of compromise between different evaluative principles, 
and whether such compromise is productive or unproductive. In particular, our 
findings reveal that the potential for accounts to provide a fertile arena for productive 
debate is related to three important processes: (1) imperfection – the extent to which 
the design and operation of accounting practices represents a ‘give and take’ between 
different evaluative principles; (2) concurrent visibility – the way in which desirable 
attributes of accounts are made visible in the design and/or operation of the 
accounting practice; and (3) the extent to which the discussions concerning potential 
problems with the accounting practice are focused on underlying evaluative principles 
(vs. mechanics/technical considerations). In the discussion below we elaborate the 
characteristics of these processes, and then conclude the paper by outlining the 
implications for future research and highlighting the insights for practice.  
 
‘Imperfection’ and the potential for ‘productive friction’ 
 In organizational settings with multiple and potentially competing evaluative 
principles, the development of compromises reflects a temporary agreement (Stark, 
2009; Kaplan & Murray, 2010; Gehman et al., 2013). In this setting, rather than 
reaching closure, the development and operation of compromising accounts entails 
on-going adjustment (c.f., Gehman et al., 2013). This was clearly evident in VSO’s 
QF, where it was subject to on-going criticism and refinement and was ‘loved by no-
one.’ We suggest that it is the ‘imperfect’ nature of the QF that was pivotal to its 
continued existence as a compromising account. We see that the constant shifting and 
rebalancing in the QF’s design and operation enabled the co-existence, albeit often 
temporary, of different modes of evaluation. Changes privileging one mode of 
evaluation, such as a focus on a more rigorous and consistent scoring process, were 
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accompanied by changes that shifted the emphasis back to another mode of 
evaluation, such as ensuring the analysis of QF data included a pairing of numbers 
with narrative. It was this ‘give and take’ between different modes that helped to 
resist pressures for recourse to a single and therefore ultimately dominant mode of 
evaluation (c.f., Thévenot, 2001), and enabled productive friction to arise from the 
coming together of different evaluative principles. In this way, compromises 
involving multiple evaluative principles are inherently ‘imperfect’ when enacted in 
practice (c.f. Annisette & Richardson, 2011). 
We see our findings in this regard as having parallels with recent literature on 
the ‘imperfect’ nature of performance measures (see, for example, Andon et al., 2007; 
Dambrin & Robson, 2011; Jordan & Messner, 2012). These studies often stress the 
importance of organizational actors ‘making do’ with the existing performance 
measurement system, despite its perceived imperfections. For example, Bürkland, 
Mouritsen & Loova (2010) show how actors compensate for ‘imperfect’ performance 
measures by using other information, while Jordan & Messner (2012) find that actors 
respond to incomplete performance measures in two ways; by trying to repair them or 
by distancing themselves from the measures. However, in our study we find that 
rather than organizational actors merely ‘making do’ with imperfect performance 
measures, it was these ‘imperfections’ that helped to provide a fertile arena for 
productive dialogue and discussion between individuals and groups with differing 
values (c.f., Stark, 2009; Jay, 2013; Gehman et al., 2013; Moor & Lury, 2011; Denis 
et al., 2007). In this way accounts can play a role in surfacing latent paradoxes and 
providing space to work out ways to combine different evaluative principles (Jay, 
2013). The struggles between different evaluative criteria can prompt those involved 
to engage in deliberate consideration about the merits of existing practices (Gehman 
et al., 2013). Here we see the importance of the accommodation of different 
perspectives and recognition by actors that the proposed solution (in our case the QF), 
although not perfect, provides a fitting answer to a problem of common interest (c.f. 
Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011; Samiolo, 2012). 
‘Imperfect’ accounts, such as VSO’s QF, are therefore not just about ‘making 
do’, but can create opportunities for bringing together competing value systems and, 
thus, the potential for what Stark (2009: 19) terms ‘productive friction.’ This was 
most evident in the league table debates, where discussions between actors with 
different evaluative principles led to changes in the use of spreadsheets and element 
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summaries that recognized a reordering of the priorities between learning and 
competition. Here we see the role of compromising accounts as creating a form of 
organized dissonance, that is, the tension that can result from the combination of two 
(at least partially) inconsistent modes of evaluation. A compromising account can 
thus be a vehicle through which dialogue, debate and productive friction is produced, 
where it is the discussion that can result from having to compromise on the design and 
operation of an account that can be productive.  
  
Concurrent visibility 
 But how does a compromising account enable organised dissonance? Our study 
indicates that an important feature of a compromising account is that of ‘concurrent 
visibility.’ To facilitate organized dissonance it was critical that the QF made visible 
the features of an account that were important to different groups. We use the term 
‘visible’ in a broad sense to refer to how the design and operation of a compromising 
account reveals the attributes of accounts that are important to organizational actors 
with different evaluative principles. For example, in the physical format of the QF, 
indicators were accompanied by narrative boxes, which enabled compromise between 
the evaluative principles of standardization and country uniqueness. In addition, the 
differential disclosure of good and poor performing countries (post the league table) 
facilitated compromise between the evaluative principles of learning and competition. 
The concurrent use of these different features gave visibility to the importance of 
different modes of evaluation. This resonates with Nahapiet (1988), where the 
resource allocation formula helped to make values more visible and tangible and 
prompted explicit consideration of three fundamental organizational dilemmas. More 
generally, it resonates with the way in which instruments like accounting and 
performance measurement systems are well suited to rendering visible the multiplicity 
of criteria of evaluation (Lamont, 2012). 
 We suggest that where the co-existence of different evaluative principles is an 
on-going feature of organizations, organizational actors are likely to be particularly 
concerned that their fundamental principles may not be respected and thus come to be 
dominated by others (c.f., Denis et al., 2007). It is here that ‘concurrent visibility’ in a 
compromising account can provide confirmation and reassurance that a particular 
mode of evaluation is, indeed, recognized and respected, thus making productive 
debate more likely. The visibility of different evaluative principles in the account also 
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serves to crystallize the compromise between them in a material form (c.f., Denis et 
al., 2007).  
 The importance of concurrent visibility is evident by contrasting the views of 
the QF at the end of the first and second years of operation. The features of the QF 
during its first year of operation (narrative, local knowledge, judgement, common 
elements and indicators) gave explicit recognition to different evaluative principles 
and thus helped to develop a compromise between values of standardization and 
country uniqueness. In contrast, changes to make the QF more consistent removed 
many of the features that recognized country uniqueness as an important evaluative 
principle. Subsequently, the initial praise for the QF had dissipated and was replaced 
by ‘endless’ disagreements and critical feedback, which resulted in a situation where 
actors were ‘stuck’ between different evaluative principles (Jay, 2013).  
 Our study also reveals, however, that there are limits to the way in which 
concurrent visibility can facilitate organized dissonance, particularly where the 
strategy is ‘additive.’ That is, to address the evaluative principles favoured by 
different organizational actors, the account can simply encompass more and more of 
those desired features. Over time, however, the account is likely to become 
cumbersome and unwieldy, as we saw with the QF when, at the end of its second year 
of operation, it was described as ‘so big, so many indicators.’ As such, without careful 
attention, concurrent visibility could potentially be directed towards the appeasement 
of different modes of evaluation rather than serving as a necessary entry point for 
productive discussion over the merits of different evaluative principles.   
  
Criticisms of accounts and breakdowns in compromise  
 Our study also highlights an important distinction between the types of 
responses that can emerge in situations where compromises break down and 
accounting practices are viewed as ‘not working.’ One criticism of the QF concerned 
the presentation of scores in a spreadsheet and the subsequent illusion of a league 
table ranking of countries according to their overall performance. Such a practice was 
viewed as privileging the value of ‘competition’ above that of ‘learning’ and was thus 
primarily a debate about the principles and values underlying the use and operation of 
the league table (c.f., Gehman et al., 2013). Here, there was a passionate response 
from those actors who felt that a fundamental principle was not being respected 
(Denis et al., 2007), particularly that the league table ignored their belief that the 
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performance and hence value of country programmes was ‘incommensurable’ 
(Espeland & Stevens, 1998). This debate was not about how to ‘fix’ the league table 
per se but focused on whether the league table itself was an appropriate practice – 
revealing a situation where actors reflect at a distance on the values underlying the 
existing practice (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Gehman et al., 2013). This helped the 
actors to confront the latent paradoxes (Jay, 2013) evident in the use of a league table 
and facilitated ‘productive friction’ between those who viewed ‘competition’ as the 
route to improvement versus those who saw learning as the way to increase quality. 
As a result, a new practice was developed (i.e., differential disclosure of good and bad 
performers) that helped to integrate different evaluative principles in a more 
substantive way (Stark, 2009; Jay, 2013).  
 Another criticism of the QF was directed at its lack of consistency and thus 
inability to enable meaningful comparisons of country performance. This was 
primarily a criticism of the implementation of the QF’s scoring process, where 
discussion focused on what was problematic about the current practice and how to fix 
it (c.f., Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Gehman et al., 2013) and not on whether scoring 
itself was an issue of concern. As such, subsequent changes to the QF focused on 
removing features of the existing scoring process that were seen not to align with the 
value of consistency, and adding features viewed as promoting consistency. Such 
changes clearly shifted the scoring process of the QF in favour of those organizational 
actors who held consistency in scoring as an essential feature of an evaluation 
process. Rather than integrating different perspectives, however, this response can be 
characterised by oscillation and ‘stuckness’ (Jay, 2013) between the evaluative 
principles of consistency and country uniqueness. Furthermore, as these debates were 
primarily focused on technicalities, they took up valuable meeting time that 
effectively preventing meaningful engagement (i.e., ‘productive friction’) with the 
underlying principles. This resonates with Stark’s (2009) warning that disputes over 
the mechanics of existing practices can limit effective changes and result in endless 
disagreements where nothing is accomplished.  
 
Conclusion 
Our study has highlighted the importance of examining the role of accounting 
in facilitating (or not) compromises in situations of multiple evaluative principles. 
Our results indicate that much can be learned by focusing on how accounts can 
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potentially bring together differing (and often competing) evaluative principles, 
where such encounters can generate productive friction, or lead to the refinement of 
accounting practices and ‘endless’ debate and discussion over technicalities and the 
mechanics of the account. We view accounts as central to processes of compromise 
in organizations because it is in discussions over the design and operation of 
accounts that the worth of things is frequently contested by organizational actors. 
Drawing on Stark’s (2009) concept of organizing dissonance, our study shows that 
there is much scope for future research to examine how accounts can create sites that 
bring together (or indeed push apart) organizational actors with different evaluative 
principles, and the ways in which this ‘coming together’ can be potentially 
constructive and/or destructive.  
Our analysis also has implications for the ways in which performance 
measures and other accounting information can be mobilized by managers and 
practitioners as a resource for action (c.f., Ahrens & Chapman, 2007; Hall, 2010). In 
particular, our results indicate that ‘imperfect’ performance measures can actually be 
helpful, that is, they can be used by practitioners to generate productive dialogue, 
despite, or, as our analysis shows, because of, their perceived imperfections. This 
resonates with Stark (2009), who argues that entrepreneurship is the ability to keep 
multiple evaluative principles in play and exploit the friction that results from their 
interplay. Here, the ‘imperfect’ nature of compromising accounts can enable skilful 
organizational actors to keep multiple evaluative principles in play. In contrast, a 
focus on the continual refinement of accounts and a quest for ‘perfection’ can lead to 
the domination of a single evaluative principle, ‘distancing’ organizational actors 
who hold different evaluative principles, and limiting opportunities for productive 
friction.  
A further implication of our study is to promote further research on how 
performance measurement systems, and accounting practices more broadly, are 
actually developed in organizations (c.f., Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). In particular, 
we analyzed the different responses that can occur when compromises breakdown 
and how they relate to the potential for productive friction. More broadly, it is 
unclear how organizational actors negotiate the development of performance 
indicators and what types of responses and arguments prove (un)successful in these 
encounters. This could prove a fruitful area for future research.  
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 We conclude by outlining the practical implications of our study, which centre 
on imperfection and concurrent visibility. Although practitioners are no doubt aware 
of the need to ‘make do’ with the perceived inadequacies of performance measures, 
our study indicates that the productive discourse arising from performance 
measurement is perhaps more important than ensuring that such measures (or 
accounts more generally) are ‘complete.’ Our analysis of concurrent visibility 
indicates that practitioners should ensure that features of accounts that are of 
fundamental importance to particular groups are explicitly recognized, whether in the 
material content of the account, the associated scoring and evaluation processes, or in 
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Formal fieldwork activity 
 
Interviews Location of staff Number of 
interviews 
Director, International Programmes Group London 2 
Deputy-Director, International Programmes Group London 1 
Regional Director London, Ghana 2 
Country Director Sri Lanka(x2), Guyana, 





Head-Programme Learning and Advocacy London 1 
Team Leader-Programme Development and Learning London 2 
Executive Assistant to Director, International 
Programmes Group 
London 3 
Programme Learning Advisor Ottawa 1 
Systems and Project Manager London 1 
Head-Strategy, Performance and Governance London 1 
Director-VSO Federation London 1 
Volunteer Placement Advisor London 1 
Finance Manager Sri Lanka 1 
Programme Manager Sri Lanka 2 
Facilities and Office Manager Sri Lanka 1 
Volunteer Sri Lanka 2 
   
  32 
 
Observation and attendance at meetings Location of meeting Number of 
meetings 
Quality Framework meetings London 6 
Various planning and review meetings London 6 
Programme planning and review workshop Sri Lanka 3 
Office planning and logistics meeting Sri Lanka 2 
   










Modes of evaluation at VSO 
 
Dimensions 
Modes of evaluation 
 
 “Learning and Uniqueness” “Consistency and Competition” 
 
Purpose of evaluation  Reflection, learning, 
improvement 
 
 Standardize, compare, 
compete 
 
Attributes of ‘good’ 
evaluation 
 Contextual, detailed, 'local’ 
interpretations 




Attributes of ‘good’ 
accounts 
 Narrative descriptions, case 
studies, stories, images 
 Indicators that provoke 
creativity, ambition and 
innovation 
 Avoid reliance on numbers 
as they provide only a 
partial account and do not 
tell the ‘real’ story 
 Numbers, indicators, and 
scales, particularly those 
that can be compared 
between units  
 Indicators that capture 
current performance 
accurately 
 Avoid reliance on narrative 
as it is ‘selective’ and 







Appendix 1: Strategic Resource Allocation tool – summary sheet 
 
Assessment of Programme Effectiveness 
Country : …………………………………. 
 
The higher the overall percentage a Programme Office receives in this tool, the more 
“effective” it will be perceived to be based on this measure.  
Section A. Focus on disadvantage (48 % of total score) 
 Measure 
% of total score 
1 HDI 17% 
2 Percentage of more disadvantaged people 
being reached through implementation of 
CSP aim 
10% 
3 Scored analysis of how well strategies are 
working in addressing the causes of 
disadvantage 
10% 
4 Disadvantage Focus in Current and 
Planned Placements 
11% 
Section  B. Outputs of Country Programme (27% of total score) 
 Measure % of total 
score 
5 What % of placements in the last 2 planning years have fully or mostly met 
their objectives (not including early return reports)? 
13% 
6 What was the Early Return rate (excluding medical & compassionate) over 
the last two planning years? 
4% 
7 What percentage of the ACP target of fully documented requests (i.e. with 




8 What percentage of the ACP target number of volunteers was in country on 




Section C strategic approach (25% of total) 
Note that the statements attached to each score are for guidance and are not absolute 
statements: we recognise that with some programmes no one statement will accurately 
describe the programme.  The RPM must have a clear idea of the rationale behind the 
scoring, in order to ensure transparency and to allow comparison between countries.  All of 
your scores should be based on an analysis of the current situation – i.e. not future strategy 
or placements.   
 
9. Strategic approach based on programme at the current time 
 
Score % of total 
score 
a)  Placements working at different levels (micro/macro) towards 
strategic aims + planned links between them. 
 4% 
b) Critical appraisal of placements with clear rationale linking 
placement to strategic aim + planned exit strategy 
 4% 
c) Strategic & linked implementation of cross cutting themes   2% 
d) In-country advocacy by the programme office  2% 
e)  PO proactive in promoting increased development 
understanding amongst volunteers  
 2% 
f) Openness and commitment to learning  5% 




h) Types of placements used most appropriate to needs of 











Name of Programme: 
Element Indicator Indicator  
result Element  result 
A.1 Annual Progress in PAP objectives is achieved  4 
A.2 Programmes and partners monitor and review progress in capacity development and/or  
service delivery  4 
B.1 Positive changes for target groups of partners are achieved  4 
B.2 Programmes and partners are able to understand, monitor and review changes for target  
groups  4 
1.1 PO is responsive to changes in social, economic and political context 4 
1.2 PO is consulted by peer agencies and / or government bodies a credible development agency  
within its field of operation 4 
1.3 Programmes working at different levels (e.g. national, provincial, districts, grass-roots)  
towards strategic aims  4 
2.1 
The contribution of National Volunteering (NV) to programme delivery has been maximised 4 
2.2. The contribution of a range of different interventions to programme delivery has been  
maximised 4 
2.3 Development awareness amongst volunteers and the wider community has been maximised 4 
2.4 Opportunities to develop international resource partnerships are fully explored and developed 4 
2.5 The contribution of advocacy to programme delivery has been maximised 4 
3.1 LTV/YFD & STV arrivals during year against reforecast plans 4 
3.2 Firm and documented placement delivery against reforecast plans 4 
3.3 Quality of placement documentation 4 
3.4 PIP milestones successfully completed across all programmes 4 
4.1 The PO has an inclusion statement and standards that are shared among all staff and that  
new staff sign. This is for both programme work and how the programme office is run 4 
4.2 Partner organisations include excluded groups in their work and as part of their target group 4 
5.1 
Number of PIPs updated and signed off annually as a result of PARs in line with guidance 4 
5.2 All programmes are reviewed annually in line with guidance 4 
6.1 Portfolio of partners in place relevant to PAP and CSP objectives 4 
6.2 Long-term (3-5 years) Partnership Plans are in place which include partnership objectives that  
are linked to the PAP objectives 4 
6.3 Partners are actively involved in programme development and review 4 
6.4 Partnerships are reviewed annually to assess progress towards Partnership and PAP  
objectives and quality of the relationship with VSO 4 
7.1 Volunteer support baselines are being met by the Programme Office and partners are  
supported to manage volunteers 4 
7.2 PO celebrates volunteer achievement, responds to volunteer problems effectively and  
encourages the development of effective and accountable volunteer groups 4 
7.3 Volunteers are engaged in programme development 4 
8.1 Value of proposals signed off by the CD/RPM against agreed quality criteria in Stage 2 of  
PMPG. 4 
8.2 Restricted income as % of PO Total Budget (including vol. recruitment costs) 4 
8.3 Donor conditions for existing funding have been met (including financial, narrative and audit  
reports submitted on time and to the standard required by the donor) throughout the year 4 
9.1 Percentage of total approved PO managed budget (restricted and unrestricted) budgeted on  
PC and VC costs in 2008/09 (Global average = 40%Regional averages range from32% and  
57%) 
4 
9.2 Possible areas of saving against costs identified during budget setting process through  
innovation and creative thinking 4 
9.3 Percentage of total revised PO managed budget (restricted and unrestricted) budgeted on  
staff costs in 2007/08 4 
10.1 Annual programme office expenditure variance (restricted plus unrestricted) for 08/09 against  
budget adjusted for macro-forecast 4 
10.2 Volunteer Unit Cost based on 08/09 budget 4 
11.1 Performance management system are being actively implemented 4 
11.2 Evidence of major HR policies and systems being adhered to 4 
12.1 Number of outstanding category A and B internal audit actions for PO action relating to legal  
compliance 4 
12.2 Security Risk management plans signed off and implemented and tested according to  
Country’s main security risks (e.g. avian flu, security, natural disasters etc) 4 
4 Programme impact at beneficiary level 
Programme delivery against plans 
4 
Staff management and support 4 










Planning and review 
4 




Relevant and ambitious strategic plans are evolved in  
response to the development needs of the countryÕs  
disadvantaged communities 4 
Appropriate and innovative use of development  
interventions to deliver programme outcomes and  
impact 
4 
Programme outcomes at partner level 
4 
Please enter name of country here 
